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Introduction &
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Training Overview
● Morning:
○ Presenters: Jim Marsteller, Susan Sons, Craig Jackson, Bob 
Cowles. 
○ Q&A period at the end of each section, but Q’s are always 
welcome
● Afternoon:
○ Deep Dives
Will frequently refer to documents at: 
trustedci.org/guide
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Goals of this Training:
1. Introduce PIs and managers of NSF LFs and CI 
Projects to a concise guide for developing and 
evolving a cybersecurity program that is 
tailored to the needs for our community.
2. Elicit discussion and feedback on the same.
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Some notes about terminology:
1. We use “information security” and 
“cybersecurity” more or less interchangeably. We 
often prefer the former, but have gotten trapped 
in the cybereverything.
2. If we throw out a term that you don’t understand, 
please stop us!
7
How this happened
8
     
How is the guide different?
1. Authored with a CI perspective
2. Contributions and critique from LF/CI community 
(TrustedCI Forum, DKIST)
3. Lighter than FISMA/NIST SPs
4. Heavier than, e.g., FCC’s small business policy 
creation tool or NISTIR 7621 Small Business 
Information Security: The Fundamentals
5. Publicly available and free to use (unlike, e.g., ISO)
6. Templates, templates, templates!!!
7. Community-driven approach - Community to 
contribute to the evolution of the guide
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So, what is a cybersecurity “program?”
“A cybersecurity program is a structured approach 
to develop, implement, and maintain an 
organizational environment conducive to 
appropriate information security and levels of 
information-related risk. Cybersecurity programs 
entail ongoing activities to address relevant policies 
and procedures; technology and mitigations; and 
training and awareness. Cybersecurity programs 
are scoped to the key assets, resources, and 
lifespan of organizations.” - CTSC
10
Why is a cybersecurity program 
important?
● Underlies trustworthy science - Maintaining the 
trust of scientists and the public in the CI, data and 
science.
● Prevents infrastructure from being used against 
others.
● Addresses information security requirements as 
defined in NSF cooperative agreements.
● Enables collaboration by supporting trust.
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What are the components of a 
comprehensive program?
1. If you’ve got it, see your Cooperative 
Agreement.
2. See the NIST Framework or any number 
of cybersecurity maturity models.
The 22 Framework Core “Categories” are 
a great place to get a feel.
12
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NSF Cooperative Agreements
Information Security Requirement 
● Incorporated in NSF’s Supplemental Financial and 
Administrative Terms and Conditions 
● Purpose is to help ensure that NSF large facilities 
and FFRDCs have policies, procedures and 
practices to protect research and education 
activities in support of the award
● Terms or requirements like this are increasingly 
common at the proposal stage. (See, recent IRNC 
solicitation.)
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CA-FATC LF Article 58 and CA-FATC FFRDC Article 61:
“Security for all information technology (IT) systems 
employed in the performance of this award, including 
equipment and information, is the awardee’s responsibility. 
Within a time mutually agreed upon by the awardee and the 
cognizant NSF Program Officer, the awardee shall provide a 
written Summary of the policies, procedures, and practices 
employed by the awardee’s organization as part of the 
organization’s IT security program, in place or planned, to 
protect research and education activities in support of the 
award.”
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CA-FATC LF Article 58 and CA-FATC FFRDC Article 61:
“The Summary shall describe the information security 
program appropriate for the project including, but not 
limited to: roles and responsibilities, risk assessment, 
technical safeguards, administrative safeguards, physical 
safeguards, policies and procedures, awareness and training, 
and notification procedures in the event of a cyber-security 
breach. The Summary shall include the institution’s 
evaluation criteria that will measure the successful 
implementation of the IT Security Program. In addition, the 
Summary shall address appropriate security measures 
required of all subawardees, subcontractors, researchers and 
others who will have access to the systems employed in 
support of this award.”
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CA-FATC LF Article 58 and CA-FATC FFRDC Article 61:
“The Summary will be the basis of a dialogue which NSF will 
have with the awardee, directly or through community 
meetings. Discussions will address a number of topics, such 
as, but not limited to, evolving security concerns and 
concomitant cyber-security policy and procedures within the 
government and at awardees' institutions, available 
education and training activities in cyber-security, and 
coordination activities among NSF awardees.”
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“Roles and Responsibilities”
CTSC Resources:
● Master Information Security Policy and Procedures 
(MISPP)
● Acceptable Use Policy (AUP)
“Risk Assessment”
CTSC Resources:
● Information Asset Inventory
● Risk Assessment Table
18
“Technical, Administrative, 
Physical Safeguards”
CTSC Resources:
● Access Control Policy
● Asset-Specific Access and Privilege Specification
● Password Policy
● Physical Security Policy
● Disaster Recovery Policy
● Incident Response Policy and Procedures 
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“Awareness and Training”
CTSC Resources:
● Information Security Training and Awareness Policy
● CTSC “Cyber Hygiene” Information Security Training 
Slide Deck
“Notification Procedures”
CTSC Resources:
● Incident Response Policy and Procedures 
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“Evaluation Criteria”
CTSC Resources:
● Master Information Security Policy and Procedures 
(MISPP)
“Appropriate Security Measures for 
Subawardees/Subcontractors, Researchers 
and Others”
CTSC Resources:
● Acceptable Use Policy (AUP) 
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Q&A
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2.
Establishing a 
Cybersecurity Program
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Establishing a Cybersecurity Program
a. Core Processes and Tools
b. Risk-Based Approaches
c. Selecting Baseline Controls
d. The Role of Risk Assessments
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CTSC Cybersecurity Program Processes 
& Core Tools
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Importance of Project Leadership
PIs have the ultimate responsibility for ensuring the 
project has an effective information security 
program
● Promote the importance of a cybersecurity 
program
● Assigning security responsibilities
● Determine acceptable levels of risk
● Support cybersecurity program
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Roles and Responsibilities
● Senior Management
○ Takes active role in allocating adequate resources, address program 
governance, accept residual risk, and follow information security policies
● Asset Owner
○ Understands risks to the asset and ensures appropriate controls are in place 
while the assets are being developed, produced, maintained, and used
● Chief Information Security Officer (CISO)
○ Knowledgeable in information security, understand how information assets 
relate to the organization’s mission, effectively communicate the issues and 
the tradeoffs; empowered as a decision-maker and key stakeholder where 
expert and timely action are required to protect organizational interests
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Project Relationships 
Play a key role in a cybersecurity program
Cyberinfrastructure(CI): Research environments that 
support advanced data acquisition, data storage, 
data management, data integration, data mining, 
data visualization and other computing and 
information processing services distributed over the 
Internet beyond the scope of a single institution. 
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Project Relationships 
 You are not alone
CI Projects are becoming increasingly distributed.
Multi-institutional, international, interdisciplinary  
but highly interconnected. Virtual project teams are 
commonplace. 
While this can create challenges, it also creates 
opportunity.
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Challenges of CI projects
● Disparate policies and requirements among 
collaborators - establishing MOUs
● Cultural differences (open research environments 
vs. restrictive govt labs); information sharing, 
communications, different compliance reqs
● Larger attack surfaces: users, servers, network 
connections, inconsistency with administration 
and management
● Specials:  ICS/SCADA, one of a kind research data
● More actors: hacktivists, governments, bad users 
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Opportunities in CI Projects
“I’ve got your back”  
● Collective knowledge a of distributed team can be 
a resource of support.  “Has anyone seen this 
unusual network traffic?”
● Improve detection ability and response times by 
sharing event information. “Mass scanning from 
IP address 201.234.178.62, suggest blocking”
● Ad-hoc support in times of need.
31
32
This slide intentionally left blank.
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Risk!
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Risk-based approaches
● NIST 800 Series / FISMA*
● HIPAA Security Rule*
● DIARMF*…. even DOD is going there; DIACAP is 
out!
● NIST Framework for Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity
● ISO 27005
● COBIT
* blended into compliance regimes
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Why risk management?  Flexibility.
● pure compliance or rule-based approaches are 
generally inappropriate for infosec 
fast-changing, relatively new, 
relatively low risk (for now)
● well-suited for organizations with limited 
resources and time
● good for situations where the type of risk is 
difficult to insure against or the “insured” is hard 
to identify
● allows for mitigation, transfer, avoidance, and 
acceptance of risk
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Why do we find the need to sell you on 
risk management?
Guesses?
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Craig’s answer: It’s risky.
1. Ownership
2. Effort
3. Time
4. Thought
5. There are lots of well-established best 
practices out there!
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Where to begin?
If I buy into a risk based approach, then what?
As we’ll discuss repeatedly, there is not just one 
answer to that question, but identifying and 
documenting your information assets, as well as 
understanding their value and/or sensitivity is a 
wildly helpful step that can be overlooked or 
underemphasized.
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“Information Assets”
40
Tips for Identifying Information Assets
1. Create and maintain solid documentation of 
what is actually there.  
a. Information Asset Inventory
b. A solid basis for selecting controls, conducting RAs; an 
investment in continuity of the program.
2. Start with your information inventory (vs 
information systems) and capturing data flows.
3. Think in terms of types of information and 
information systems; get more detailed as 
needed.
4. Take the opportunity to get a handle on the 
security objectives for those assets.
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Yes, we’ve got a template for that.
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Information Asset Details:
● What’s included in this set?
● Why do we have it?  Where is it coming from, and what do 
we use it for?
● How is this set stored?
○ Format
○ Location
○ Backups
● Where should this data travel?
○ Who and what systems should be able to access?
○ How will it get there?
○ How is that movement protected?  (e.g., authentication, 
encryption)
● What, if anything, sets this data apart from other things in 
the type?
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The ‘CIA’ Triad of Security Objectives
Confidentiality  Preserving authorized restrictions on access and disclosure, 
including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information.  A loss of 
confidentiality is the unauthorized disclosure of information.
Integrity Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, 
and includes ensuring information authenticity.  A loss of integrity includes the 
unauthorized modification or destruction of information, and the unauthorized 
control of an information system. 
Availability Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of assets.  A loss of 
availability is the disruption of access to or use of an asset.
See, 44 U.S.C. 3542(b) and FIPS 199 
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By focusing on preventing “losses of information security,” CIA objectives sit between 
the fundamental reasons why we protect info assets and the controls we put in place.
Project Mission & Interests
Controls
‘CIA’ Security Objectives
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The process for info systems is similar:
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Details on information systems:
● Hardware specs & serials (if applicable)
● Software packages & major version numbers
● What data does this system touch?
● How does that data get in and out, and where does 
it go to / come from?
● What can this system control?  How is that done?
● What does normal operation of this system look 
like? What runs on this system?
● How do we know when it’s not behaving?
● What administrative systems control and document 
this system?
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Q&A
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Next Up:
Selecting Baseline Controls
49
All these can feed into selecting controls, 
but we need to talk about selecting baseline controls.
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Selecting Baseline Controls: 
You have options!
● Concise Best Practices Guides
○ SANS/NSA/CSIS Critical Security Controls
○ CTSC’s Securing Commodity IT
● Extensive Best Practices Guides 
○ 800-53 rev 4
○ ISO 27002
● Risk Assessment Results
○ Lots more on RA’s later
● Program Evaluation Frameworks / Maturity 
Models
● What to choose?...
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Project timeline and lifespan are important
52
Best Practices Guides
● Concise Best Practices Guides
○ SANS Critical Security Controls
○ CTSC’s Securing Commodity IT 
● Extensive Best Practices Guides 
○ NIST SP 800-53 rev 4
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Program Evaluation Frameworks & 
Maturity Models
● Overarching best practices view of a program
● E.g., 
○ NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity
○ Booz Allen Cyber Operations Maturity Framework
○ Higher Education Information Security Council (HEISC) 
Information Security Program Assessment Tool
○ Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity 
Model (ES-C2M2)
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Q&A
55
The Role of Risk Assessments
● NOT the same as risk management
● A flexible tool:  gauging the relative magnitude 
of risks
● Can be focused on one asset or your whole 
project
● An input to decisions around resource allocation
● An opportunity to gauge control effectiveness
● E.g., NIST SP 800-30
56
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(Estimated) Impact 
x
(Estimated) Likelihood 
= 
(Inherent) Risk (Level)
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Risk Assessment is fundamentally….
About matching available effort and resources to 
feasible threats in order to achieve acceptable 
levels of risk.
Crown jewels + 
Likely threat event + 
No Controls = 
We’ve got a problem
Commodity IT + Controls 
are cheap/easy + 
No Controls = 
We’ve got an easy win
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Risk Assessment Recommendations
1. Consider holding off on a formal or extensive risk 
assessment, and first consider the scope, 
structure, and roadmap for your program.
2. Consider lightweight or heavyweight, targeted or 
comprehensive assessments based on where 
you are in your project lifespan and available 
resources
3. Take an asset-based approach (particularly if 
your project and/or cyber program are new):
Understanding the value and sensitivity (and location and 
access controls) of your information and information systems 
is an early step to any risk assessment
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Kickstarting a program
A couple case examples...
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Case 1… a new project, kickstarting a 
program 
● Identify your information assets (information + 
information systems), and know which are 
mission critical and sensitive.
● Identify & implement best practices. Society has 
done the risk assessment for you!
○ If no best practices exist / too complex to identify or 
implement / want to make sure you’ve got the critical 
stuff covered…. get help.
● Pick a maturity model or use the NIST 
Framework to envision your program.  How 
sophisticated can you afford to be?
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Case 2… a not-so-new project, 
kickstarting a program
1. Identify Critical Risks
a. “Cybercheckup” - Identifying holes in the ship.
b. Black swans. Reduce impact / contingency planning.
c. Grey pigeons. High-likelihood/frequency incidents. 
Reduce frequency and aggregate impact.
d. Low-hanging fruit.  May be outside critical zone, but 
cheap, easy wins.
2. Select Targeted Controls
a. Again, best practices!
3. Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover… 
remember its not all about prevention.
Pigeon Credit - Ian Burt - CC by 2.064
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That said…. Let’s talk a bit more about our approach 
to formal risk assessments, tips, and tools.
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Benefits of a Formal Risk Assessment
● Assist a project with identifying gaps in a security 
program
● Output of a RA can be used to develop a 
cybersecurity plan (mitigation plan and 
ownership)
● More advanced designs can be used to evaluate 
control effectiveness 
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NIST SP 800-30 rev 1, Appendix I, p.I-3
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NIST 800-30, Appendix I, Page D-2.69
Basic InfoSec Risk Management Terms
Asset: Assets are valuable and/or sensitive organizational 
information and information systems.
Vulnerability: Any circumstance or event with the potential to 
adversely impact organizational operations (including mission, 
functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, individuals, 
other organizations and/or stakeholders through an information 
system via a loss of information security
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Basic InfoSec Risk Management Terms
Threat: Any circumstance or event with the potential to 
adversely impact organizational operations (including mission, 
functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, individuals, 
other organizations and/or stakeholders through an information 
system via a loss of information security.
Control: The management, operational, and technical 
safeguards or countermeasures prescribed for an information 
system to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability 
of information assets
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Use an asset based approach
Characterizing Threats
72
How does the threat attack the asset?
Characterizing Threats
73
Estimating Impact
Impact measures the degree of potential harm to 
organizational interests.
Things to consider when estimating impact:
● Asset value
● Asset sensitivity 
● Nature of impact (financial, reputation, human 
harm)
● Cost of response
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Estimating Impact
CTSC Risk Assessment Scale:
If the incident were to occur, what would be the 
potential impact (of a single occurrence)?
5 - Catastrophic
4 - Major
3 - Moderate
2 - Minor
  1 - Insignificant
75
Estimating Impact
5 - Catastrophic
4 - Major
3 - Moderate
2 - Minor
1 - Insignificant
76
Estimating Likelihood
What it is: Probability that a vulnerability will be 
exercised by a threat
Things to consider when estimating likelihood:
● Anticipated frequency (10 year or 100 flood?)
● Motivation, knowledge and capabilities of threat 
sources 
● Specifics of vulnerability (easy/difficult to 
execute)
● Confidence in performing the estimation
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Estimating Likelihood 5 - Constant, or extremely frequent4 - Very frequent
3 - Somewhat frequent
2 - Infrequent
1 - Rarely, if ever
78
Estimating Control Effectiveness and 
Residual Risk 5 - Extremely effective
4 - Very effective
3 - Moderately effective
2 - Minimally effective
1  - Ineffective
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Using the results of the assessment
● If residual risk level is not acceptable, select 
additional controls to attain acceptable risk level
● Determine action plan and activity owner
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Tips for carrying out comprehensive RAs
1. Operationalize your definitions. 
Is “extremely likely” a frequency of every day, 
week, or month?
2. Consistently apply concepts from risk to risk.  
Don’t switch definitions based on the risk!
3. Consistently characterize threats; include a set 
of common elements in each description. (Or, 
use a catalogue; see Appendices E and F of 800-
30)
4. Solicit estimations from multiple sources / 
validation.
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Q&A
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3.
Policy Development
83
Policy Development
Program formalization is a key step in virtually all 
maturity models for distinguishing relatively 
immature programs from relatively mature.  Policy 
development and implementation is necessary for 
formalization.
Results in:
● Reproducible, communicable, and enforceable 
processes.
● Artifacts that can be critiqued and evolved.
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Templates!!!
We will refer to templates found at the following 
page:  http://trustedci.org/guide
Cautionary Note:  You will have to make these your 
own.
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Policy Development
1. A brief overview of the range of policies
2. Highlight a selection of policies
3. Talk about some tips
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Policies we’ll highlight
● Master Information Security Policy and 
Procedures (MISPP)
● Acceptable Use Policy (AUP)
● Incident Response Policies & Procedures
● Access Control Policy
● A note about Privacy Policies
(But… Physical security, disaster recovery, asset management, 
HR-specific, “specials” specific…. other policies can be critically 
important for your project.)
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Master Information Security 
Policy & Procedures (MISPP)
Purpose:  Core, general policies + guide for navigating the full 
corpus of policies and procedures.
Audience:  You and all your stakeholders.
● Roles & Responsibilities (... CISO, Leadership)
● Developing, Implementing, and Maintaining Our 
Cybersecurity Program (... core processes)
● Resources & Key Contacts (... we’re here to help)
● Other Policy and Procedure Documents (... a gateway of 
sorts)
● Enforcement provisions
● Terms & Acronyms
● … plus anything else so central to the program that it 
warrants stating here
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Acceptable Use Policy (AUP)
Purpose:  Establish a code-of-conduct for all users on the usage 
of a resource/information system.
Audience:  You and all your stakeholders.
● Define rights and responsibilities of all users
● Establishes authority 
● Consequences of infractions to policy (suspension, legal, 
criminal)
● Reduce Liability: disclaimers, no warranties
● Other Policy and Procedure Documents (Privacy, Password, 
management, Academic Citation)
● Contact Information (General support, Emergency/Security)
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Incident Response Policy
Purpose:  Decide and document what to do in the event of a 
security incident BEFORE on happens, so that the response can 
be both rapid and well thought out.
Audience:  IT and helpdesk staff, incident response team
● Define priorities for IR (e.g. relative importance of gathering 
forensic data vs. minimizing downtime)
● Define who is responsible for which decisions
● Lay out response procedures for grey pigeon and black swan 
events
● Specify when and how response procedures will be tested
● Afternoon IR training available!
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Access Control Policy
Purpose: Define how access to various information assets (both 
systems and data) will be mediated, as well as who will be 
allowed access to what. 
Audience:  All users, stakeholders, and IT staff.
● You must first know what your assets are.
● Least privilege principle
● Authentication vs. authorization
● Impacts every control
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A note about privacy policies...
We didn’t template one, on purpose. 
● You may or may not be required to have one.
● You may or may not want to have one.
● Input is key…. think general counsel.
● Int’l collaboration can complicate things in a 
hurry.
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Policy Development: Tips, Gotchas
● Do:
a. Involve stakeholders (yes, even the relevant lawyers)
b. Prioritize
c. Use templates, examples
d. Ask for help
e. Share the resulting policies and train your personnel
● Please don’t:
a. Allow policies to be developed and filed away without a 
formal approval process
b. Work in a vacuum
c. Assume you need one of each
d. Be afraid to take this seriously 
e. Underestimate the power of v2
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Q&A
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Section 4:
Putting It To Work
Education & Implementation
95
Who cares?
...and what do I do with everybody else?
Dangers of 
shadow IT
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Inside Users / Personnel:
● “Cyber Hygiene”
○ See this slide deck at http://trustedci.org/guide
● Specific policies that impact their job
● When to get help or ask a question
Outside Users:
● AUP (Acceptable Use Policy)
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Training methods matter.
Training:
● In person
● Be personable
● Make it relevant
● Sales, not just exposition.
Providing information is only half the job.
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The everyday experience will teach your team 
more than any training you give them.
What is it teaching them?


Putting it all in place
New Projects:
● Put security practices in place as 
parts of your project/CI come 
online.
● You can and should evolve your 
program over time: don’t get 
stalled trying to do everything at 
once.
● Focus on hygiene (e.g., best 
practices) first, and big dangers as 
they become apparent (grey 
pigeons and black swans).
Established Projects:
● Documenting your assets may be a 
big job.  Do it anyway.
● Find gaps, then prioritize and fill.
● Implement changes in stages rather 
than all at once.
● The more you grow, the more you’ll 
want to consider automation.
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Section 5:
The Daily Joy of 
Operational Security
105
106
107
108
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Continuous Monitoring
i.e., Appropriately Frequent Monitoring
● Threat monitoring
○ SANS Internet Storm Center; United States Computer 
Emergency Response Team (US-CERT); SANS also has a 
weekly and semi-weekly newsletters 
● Configuration and Vulnerability Management
○ OS and application software checked that current, 
patched versions are installed and securely configured
● Log collection and analysis
○ Logs from devices provide data about attacks
○ Many management tools are available; also external 
monitoring services111
External Resources and Partners
● Your Internet Service Provider
● Parent Institution
● Peer Organizations
● Commercial Security Consultants
● REN-ISAC
● Bro Center of Expertise
● FBI Cyber Crime Unit
● CTSC
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Using External Security Sources
● NIST SP 800-35 and SP 800-36 contain advice
● Get insight into what external sources have to 
offer
○ Balance risks, costs, and benefits
○ Trade-offs: control, resource demands, available 
expertise 
● Clarify expectations
○ Ensure contract service level agreement (SLA), 
memorandum of understanding (MOU), or other 
agreement outlines relevant security expectations
113
Incident Response
● Develop and communicate a plan of action
○ For compromised desktop, server, network
● Include a communication plan
○ Who talks to management, media, CERT, etc.
○ What frequency and kind of information passed on
● Post-mortem analysis and report
○ Root cause analysis
○ Gauge effectiveness of controls
○ Develop remediation plan, if necessary
RULE: Don’t talk to the media
114
Incident Response Plans
● A determined attacker will succeed and there 
are many places to hide
● If you are on the Internet, then you are 
compromised -- the problem is to find them and 
recover to a “good place”
● Create a general plan based on “PDCA” or 
“OODA” loops (see Wikipedia articles for 
explanation)
DON’T PANIC
Douglas Adams, HHGTTG
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Section 6: 
Keeping Your 
Program Healthy
So you’ve...
...figured out what assets you are protecting.
...taken a look at your risks.
...written policies and procedures.
...trained personnel.
In short, you’ve made a plan and followed it.
Now What?
117
Keeping Your Program Healthy Means:
● Keeping security-related overhead low so you won’t have to 
choose between information security and your core mission.
● Testing procedures to make sure they work
○ Incident response is your most important area to test, 
because when you need it, something has already gone 
wrong.
● Reviewing policies to ensure that they still fit your project or 
organization well.
● Risk Assessment, Program Evaluation
118
Congrats, your job is 
security.
(and science, and teaching, and mentoring 
interns, and getting grants, and…)
What should we test and 
how often should we test it?
Q&A
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How much policy review is 
enough?
122
Section 7: Conclusion
CTSC Cybersecurity Program Processes 
& Core Tools
124
Next steps for our team.
1. Incorporating your feedback and ideas in our 
training and the Guide.
2. Looking for more opportunities to work through 
the guide with NSF projects
3. Data Breach Handling Template
4. Information of budgeting for cybersecurity 
personnel and programs
5. Consider implications of int’l collaboration
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Q&A
Review
1. Introduction & Overview
2. Establishing a Cybersecurity Program
3. Policy Development
4. Putting It To Work
5. The Daily Joy
6. Keeping Your Program Healthy
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Resources
● Center for Trustworthy Scientific Cyberinfrastructure
○ http://trustedci.org/contact/
○ http://trustedci.org/guide/ 
○ http://trustedci.org/ctsc-email-lists/ 
● NIST Cybersecurity Framework
○ http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/
● NIST Special Publications
○ http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html
● Critical Security Controls
○ https://www.sans.org/critical-security-controls/ 
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Thanks!
Let’s eat.
130
Welcome back!
131
Afternoon Sessions
1. Goals:
a. More opportunity for inter-project sharing.
b. Offer guidance on this identified challenges.
c. Unearth issues where there is a lot of resonance across 
the community. (Findings for the summit report.)
2. Format:
a. Facilitated discussion interlaced with expert 
pontification?
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Deep Dive #1: Cybersecurity Program Governance, 
Risk Acceptance, and Intra-organization Communication.
We think of a cybersecurity program as a 
multifaceted, multi-domain activity (almost a living 
organism) involving organizational dynamics, 
people, technology, insiders, outsiders, 
stakeholders…. 
What have people experienced are the major 
roadblocks or deal breakers for a healthy 
cybersecurity program?
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Deep Dive #1: Cybersecurity Program Governance, 
Risk Acceptance, and Intra-organization Communication.
Risk acceptance is the process of accepting residual risk (i.e., the risk that remains 
after controls are applied), and it is a critical part of any risk-based approach to any 
type of hazard over which we cannot exert full control.  In the archetypal case, it 
involves an agent communicating well-grounded risk information to a principal who 
has authority to accept risk on behalf of an organization, or push for greater control.  
At its best, it is a process of informed decision-making and balancing costs and 
benefits.  In reality, it can be complicated, imperfectly executed, imperfectly 
understood, entirely ignored….  (our issues with this area was a Finding in 2014).
What experiences do you have with the risk acceptance 
process?  How formal or informal are things in your 
projects/facilities?  Is information security risk acceptance 
authority distributed, or confined to one role?  
What works?  What doesn’t?
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Deep Dive #2: Securing Novel Technologies
For our purposes, a “novel technology” is one that 
is not mature enough and/or not common enough 
for a robust set of best security practices to have 
been developed, widely communicated, and 
iterated on.
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Deep Dive #2: Securing Novel Technologies
0.  Know what you are securing.
● Devices, data, people and processes
● CIA Needs
1. Follow the data
2. Work from the principles that apply to 
everything:
○ Least Privilege
○ Minimize Attack Surfaces
○ Separation of Concerns
3. Document and monitor so that you can respond 
and iterate.
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